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Introduction: This paper examines the cost of quality improvements in Population Services International (PSI)
Myanmar’s social franchise operations from 2007 to 2009.
Methods: The social franchise commodities studied were products for reproductive health, malaria, STIs,
pneumonia, and diarrhea. This project applied ingredients based costing for labor, supplies, transport, and
overhead. Data were gathered seven during key informant interviews with staff in the central Yangon office,
examination of 3 years of payroll data, examination of a time motion study conducted by PSI, and spreadsheets
recording the costs of acquiring and transporting supplies.
Results: In 2009 PSI Myanmar’s social franchise devoted $2.02 million towards a 94% reduction in commodity
prices offered to its network of over 1700 primary care providers. These providers retained 1/3 of the subsidy as
revenue and passed along the other 2/3 to their patients in the course of offering subsidized care for 1.5 million
health episodes. In addition, PSI Myanmar devoted $2.09 million to support a team of franchise officers who
conducted quality assurance for the private providers overseeing service quality and to distributing medical
commodities.
Conclusion: In Myanmar, the social franchise operated by PSI spends roughly $1.00 in quality management and
retailing for every $1.00 spent subsidizing medical commodities. Some services are free, but patients also pay fees
for other lines of service. Overall patients contribute 1/6 as much as PSI does. Unlike other NGO’s, health services in
social franchises like PSI are not all free to the patients, nor are the discounts uniformly applied. Discounts and
subsidies evolve in response to public health concerns, market demand, providers’ cost structures as well as
strategic objectives in maintaining the network and its portfolio of services.
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Without oversight, private health care markets will reli-
ably disappoint social expectations for service quality
and their accessibility to the poor [1]. To satisfy con-
cerns for quality and accessibility, some entity will need
to intervene as a steward of private health care markets
and their stewardship will incur costs. Spending money* Correspondence: dbishai@jhsph.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orto improve service quality and offer access to the poor
will often fail to register impact in terms of conventional
cost-effectiveness metrics such as dollars per disability
or quality adjusted life year. Some would argue that
health systems improvements that cannot be shown to
improve population health should not receive priority.
In contrast, the United Nations states that high quality
health facilities are an essential element of the right to
health [2]. According to the UN, governments should
improve health care quality to guarantee citizen rights,
not just because quality improvement is efficient nor to
the extent that quality saves lives. Much of economictd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
Bishai et al. Cost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation 2013, 11:14 Page 2 of 7
http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/11/1/14evaluation remains consequentialist and excludes from
analysis any preferences patients might have about the
processes that the health system uses to achieve health
outcomes [3]. Beyond welfarism, and extra-welfarism is
the reality that the quality of services matters to patients
and equality of access matters and patients and policy
makers are willing to spend resources to improve these
aspects of the health system.
In areas where government stewardship is lacking,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) find them-
selves assuming a role in improving health service qual-
ity. Typical medical NGOs in low income countries hire
most of their medical care providers and keep them on a
payroll and directly supervise service quality. There are
other NGOs, for example social franchises, that gather
private sector providers in a network and improve ser-
vice quality without directly hiring providers [4,5].
As more donors face situations where health system
stewardship requires creative solutions they want to be
sure their investments serve the purposes intended. Lit-
tle is known about what it costs to improve quality and
improve service access in the private sector of low in-
come countries. Existing studies in Ethiopia and Pakistan
show that social franchises can provide higher quality
than non-franchised private clinics, but with higher costs
per client treated for family planning services [6].
By following the flow of funds in a social franchise that
is explicitly focused on service quality and reaching the
poor, we can assess what it will cost to address some of
the most dire deficiencies in the health system. Improv-
ing service quality in any system will require extra re-
sources—until these resources are defined and financed,
progress will be difficult.
The objective of this paper is to measure the cost of
health care quality improvements by focusing on the op-
erations of the Sun Quality and Sun Primary health net-
works operated by Population Services International
(PSI) in Myanmar. For every dollar spent by patients ac-
quiring medical care in a social franchise, our analysis
will tally the total dollars spent by the franchise on sub-
sidizing that service and regulating its quality. Ordinarily,
customers pay more than the wholesale price. Because
social franchises are not like ordinary retail markets, our
analysis will identify the areas where patients pay less than
wholesale.
Background
The sale of medical care episodes in competitive private
markets allows one to observe prices paid by buyers.
Competitive forces and the absence of insurance programs
in Myanmar make it plausible that the equilibrium prices
for private medical care observed in Myanmar reflect what
patients are willing to pay to purchase medical care
episodes and what suppliers can comfortably afford tosell them for. This market solution to medical care
provision succeeds in balancing supply with demand. It is
well known to fail to provide quality and to protect the
poor [7].
Protecting the poor requires subsidies and improving
quality requires resources. To improve and monitor the
quality of professional services there must be some type
of data collection exercise. Somehow or other informa-
tion about services provided needs to be collected,
inspected, and feedback must be given to the provider
with advice and/or incentives for improvement. Low
capacity, competing priorities, and political opposition
hinders efforts to achieve adequate quality regulation of
the private practice of medical care. The problem is
global [8]. The social franchising solution used by PSI/
Myanmar is to use the commodity distribution network
to also serve as way to monitor and improve the quality
of service.
In a social franchise, a network of private providers
is created. There are two separate networks in PSI
Myanmar: Sun Quality Health (SQH) network is primar-
ily physicians and advanced health professionals while
Sun Primary Health (SPH) providers typically have a
lower level of training and often operate as mobile pro-
viders in an effort to reach those most at risk and in
rural areas. In the franchised delivery model “Sun Field
Leaders” serve as the quality supervisors and the distrib-
utors of subsidized commodities. The subsidies sustain
the continued voluntary membership and they encour-
age providers to devote time and space to services they
might not otherwise provide. Sometimes the providers
devote 100% of their activities to services associated with
the franchise, sometimes, as in a fractional franchise, the
providers offer other services or products besides those
of the franchise. PSI/Myanmar is an example of a frac-
tional franchise. Private providers in the franchise also
agree to receive regular visits by the franchisor dedicated
to monitoring and improving service quality in the use
of these commodities [4,5]. The structural design of a
social franchise allows one to determine separately the
costs of solving public policy problems of subsidizing
access and enhancing quality. We compare these costs
to the private costs that households expend to solve
their private problem of acquiring medical services. This
analysis can thus produce estimates of the ratio of costs
expended to supply the publicly valued aspects of med-
ical care episodes to the costs that patients routinely pay
to purchase privately valued episodes.
In 2009, PSI’s franchising department supported a
team of over 1,700 private providers currently enrolled
in PSI’s Network. There were 1006 and 741 in the Sun
Quality and Sun Primary Health Networks, respectively
in 2009. Social franchising activities were supported in
part by four other departments within PSI’s organizational
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formation (36 staff ); (3) Finance (136 staff ); and (4) Pro-
gram Support (125 staff ). These departments were
supported by international technical advisors, senior advi-
sors, an executive office team, the finance monitoring unit,
and a special advocacy team, all of which fall under the
leadership of PSI-Myanmar’s country director. Most critic-
ally, the social marketing department works to provide
support to product branding as well communications,
whilst strategic information facilitates the collection of
routine data on products sales, distribution, and incentives.
There is emerging evidence that the PSI network of
providers in Myanmar is able to improve service quality.
The SPH members can attend two initial 3-day trainings,
one month apart and then receive regular visits by field
leaders and stocks of rapid diagnostic test kits and
artemisin containing treatment packs. In an evaluation
of PSI/Myanmar’s effects on quality of care, a team of
researchers validated [9] and applied the use of an ob-
served simulated patient to assess the management of a
child with malaria by providers before and after adopting
the PSI-malaria line of service [10]. They found that
workers enrolled in PSI’s malaria program achieved and
sustained better performance in managing malaria for
over 12 months [10]. There is also evidence that
Myanmar’s PSI network is able to target the poor. In
urban areas, TB patients at SQH clinics were more likely
to be in the poorest quintile compared to the general TB
positive urban population [11]. These promising results
motivate the present investigation into the cost of PSI/
Myanmar’s service improvement and delivery model.
Methods
Data
Since its inception in 2001, Population Services Inter-
national (PSI) Myanmar’s social franchising program has
expanded from a focus on reproductive health to include
new providers and disease treatment lines for malaria
and STIs (2003), tuberculosis (2004), and diarrhea and
pneumonia in children under 5 (2008) [12]. The tuber-
culosis program in PSI allows TB patients to obtain their
directly observed treatment short course (DOTS) under
the supervision of the private provider. The economics
of the TB program are very different from the other lines
of service: patients pay no fees to the provider, providers
receive capitated payments from the TB program, drugs
are procured by the national TB program. These special
features make the TB program sufficiently different that
it will not be considered here.
Costs were estimated using an ingredients approach
for 2007 to 2009 through a retrospective review of finan-
cial reports maintained by PSI-Myanmar’s Finance De-
partment in Yangon. All figures were presented in 2009
USD, corresponding to the final year of analysis. The PSIfinance department in Yangon, Myanmar provided ac-
cess to official Government of Myanmar monthly ex-
change rates for the 2007–2009 analytic time horizon.
Period averages were generated for each year and uti-
lized to Kyats to US dollars. Costs incurred during years
prior to 2009 were converted to 2009 dollars using local
consumer price indices obtained from the IMF's Inter-
national Financial Statistics Yearbook. The financial ac-
counting system prior to 2007 was maintained on a
different system of ledgers making it difficult to recon-
cile expenditure categories. Emphasis was placed upon
the identification of major activities associated with the
scale-up and sustained implementation of SQH and SPH
delivery channels and new lines of services. There are
four major elements to the cost model. Figure 1 breaks
them into two elements at the level of Franchisor (PSI)
and two elements at the level of the Franchisee (Private
provider). These are as follows: A. Costs to PSI head-
quarters to acquire medical commodities; B. Costs to
PSI associated with the packaging, distribution, and ser-
vice monitoring related to products channeled through
the franchise network C. Revenue received by providers
in return for product sales; D. Revenue received by SPH/
SQH providers in the delivery of professional services.
Procurement of commodities and supplies
PSI/Myanmar’s procurement department communicates
with international and local suppliers. They also are at-
tuned to the drug registration processes at the Myanmar
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). PSI proactively ob-
tains clearance from the Myanmar government to import
commodities. PSI-Myanmar’s procurement department is
comprised of a staff of 9 including access to an inter-
national advisor, program support director, senior pro-
curement manager and five additional support staff
located within three sub-units: (1) local procurement; (2)
quality control; and (3) international procurement. In
addition to country-level procurement in Myanmar, PSI’s
global headquarters in Washington, DC maintains a
separate procurement department that supports country-
level requests in excess of US$10,000. For these larger
orders, PSI-Washington coordinates internationally com-
petitive bidding, product quality control testing and
shipment to Myanmar. The Washington office obtains
globally competitive prices and takes advantage of bulk-
purchasing power, often sourcing commodities in Asia.
The overhead for global procurement from Washington
is a cost shared by dozens of countries and millions of
people and would not be altered by the presence or ab-
sence of a Myanmar operation, so it is omitted from
analysis.
Once products are procured, PSI sells medical com-
modities (tuberculosis treatment being the sole excep-
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Figure 1 Conceptual framework. The top two rows relate to costs and inputs supplied by PSI as franchisor. The bottom two rows are costs and
inputs supplied by private health care providers. The “inputs” supplied by PSI are price reductions as well as oversight of the distribution network
and final medical care episode. This oversight occurs under the agency of franchise officers who visit each private provider on a monthly basis.
The inputs supplied by private providers are medical commodities and professional effort.
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subsidized in order to interest providers in offering ser-
vices that they would not otherwise offer and to sustain
their voluntary participation in the network.
Costs associated with the packaging and distribution of
commodities
Once procured, commodities are packaged in Yangon-
based warehouses. The packaging utilized is designed by
PSI’s marketing and communications department and
produced locally in Myanmar. Financial records were
reviewed to determine costs associated with the pack-
aging, re-sale and distribution of products in Myanmar.
In the design of social franchises product distribution to
clinics is inseparable from the supervision of service
quality during monthly visits to each member. PSI/
Myanmar’s franchise officers are all physicians and they
spend several hours during each visit reviewing clinical
records, identifying complex cases, and discussing case
management with providers.
Unit cost analysis was done and the results presented.
An ingredients based model of the franchise services
and those of supporting PSI-departments was utilized to
allocate overhead costs. As part of this activity, key in-
formant interviews with staff in all departments were
carried out to identify the full portfolio of products pro-
cured, supporting materials generated, and appropriateproportion attributable to the franchising component of
PSI’s overall portfolio. Interviews were carried out with
the following staff of PSI Myanmar Office 1) Director; 2)
Chief financial officer; 3) Chief procurement officer; 4)
Current chief of franchising operations; 5) Past chief of
franchising; 6) Chief of research; 7) Current chief of social
marketing. The interviews were used to determine the
appropriate lines of service to study and how to allocate
administrative overhead to the various lines of service.
The documents reviewed consisted of electronic led-
gers of all payments for 2007 to 2009 and log books of
all commodities distributed to franchise members for
the same period. The ledgers and log-books contained
the financial data that form the substance of the unit
cost estimates we present. The PSI/Myanmar office had
conducted a time –motion study in an attempt to meas-
ure the contribution of franchise officers’ time across the
various product lines and across administrative work vs.
quality supervision.
Allocating overhead from the administrative units at
headquarters was based on the proportion of commodity
costs attributed to the franchising program. Indirect
costs associated with building and administrative costs
were allocated at approximately 33% to the franchising
program. This percentage reflects the total proportion of
PSI’s annual franchising budget out of the total annual
operating budget for all programs. Direct costs associated
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were obtained through an intensive review of PSI’s finan-
cial records and cross-checked through in-depth inter-
views with PSI staff to ensure the exhaustive inclusion of
all potential expenditures.
Revenue received by PSI headquarters in return for
commodities
We estimated the total revenue PSI/Myanmar received
in return for the sale of commodities to its members.
Data on total products sold and funds received were
obtained from PSI’s management records.
Costs incurred by SPH/SQH providers in the delivery of
commodities and services
Providers are allowed by the franchise to sell most of the
purchased products that they have acquired at subsidized
prices. There are exceptions: for example, there can be no
charges for TB drugs. Furthermore it is recommended
that providers adhere to PSI’s pricing list. Data on the
revenue obtained by providers through the sale of their
products are not collected, however we do know how
many commodities were sold and their suggested retail
price. Providers agree to a PSI price and fee schedule in
billing for the commodities and professional services that
are required to accompany the PSI commodities, and they
post the fees on the wall of the facility. With data on the
number of visits we use the fee schedule to benchmark
the amount of retail revenue private providers would
obtain from selling commodities distributed by PSI. We
compare administrative costs and subsidies to this
benchmark.
Results
Table 1 demonstrates the total cost for all PSI procure-
ment activities across all programs for 2007–2009. As
shown in Table 1 the procurement costs for commod-
ities in the franchising program cost a total of $2.15
million in 2009. Table 1 only shows the costs of com-Table 1 Procurement costs for all major PSI programs by
major disease areas for 2009 in USD
2009 2008 2007
RH $905,577 $921,684 $807,870
Malaria $1,067,708 $410,445 $347,118
STI $22,731 $42,868 $39,485
TB Suspect $- $- $-
Pneumonia $26,463 $15,166 $-
Diarrhea* $126,356 $611 $696
TOTAL $2,148,835 $1,390,775 $1,195,169
*Prior to 2009 diarrhea program was a water treatment product called
Waterguard, this was joined by ORS products in 2009 as shown in Additional
file 1: Table S4.modities distributed through private providers in SQH
and SPH networks. PSI Myanmar is able to recover
$125,541 from the SQH and SPH members who pay
marked down prices for commodities. Thus its total in-
jection of financing into supporting lower prices of com-
modities totals $2.02 million in 2009.
Table 2 tracks the commodity subsidies provided by
PSI/ Myanmar. Column A shows the total that PSI
Myanmar spends to procure commodities and subse-
quently column B shows the payments received by its
members for these commodities. For 2009, $2.15 million
in commodities were devoted to these 5 categories of ser-
vice in the franchise program. Overall franchise members
are receiving commodities at a 94% discount from prices
on the world market. The discounts are somewhat less for
the antibiotics used for STIs and pneumonia. Based on
recommended sales prices, we estimate that the providers
generated revenue of $648,000 from the medical visits as-
sociated with these commodities. The pricing structure
thus passed along $1.38 million in subsidized medical
commodities to the patients of Myanmar, with most of the
subsidy being generated by commodities for malaria. As
shown in Table 2, patients do not receive subsidized pri-
cing for STI and pneumonia commodities. For STIs and
pneumonia, the Sun network providers are behaving like
ordinary retailers and marking up wholesale prices. The
antibiotic pricing policy was negotiated as an incentive to
persuade franchise members to integrate STI treatment
into their practice. The higher markups are also enabled
both by a robust demand for antibiotics in Myanmar and
by competitive advantages that PSI’s procurement depart-
ment has achieved in securing lower antibiotic prices than
those available to other private sector health providers.
Table 3 shows the total costs of maintaining the franchise
system to check provider quality and distribute commod-
ities at $2.09 million in 2009. Personnel costs account for
32% of the total with allocated vehicles and transport
accounting for 21% of the total for 2009. The share of PSI’s
overhead allocated to its franchising division is $180,000
and accounts for 9% of the cost. Note that services are
growing from roughly $750,000 in 2007 to $2 million in
2009. (Additional file 1: Table S4 shows a growth in the
number of SPH providers from 137 in 2008 to 858 in 2010.
Additional file 2: Table S5 shows a growth in the number of
providers offering reproductive health services in the SQH
network from 710 in 2007 to 930 in 2009). One implication
is that some of the spending is being incurred for start up
costs of new product lines and new service areas. PSI/
Myanmar has shown annual growth since its inception. It
is too early to say whether the growth and expansion costs
are exceptional or part of the nature of the organization.
In the franchised health care system operated by PSI
Myanmar, PSI’s outlay of resources to achieve lower
commodity prices is $2.02 million (=$2,148,835 spent
Table 2 Tracking the flow of subsidies for commodities in PSI Myanmar





















[A] [B] [A-B] [A-B]/A C = (Sale
Price ×
Volume)
[D = A-(B + C)] [D/A]
RH $878,377 $156,463 $721,914 82% $347,589 $374,325 42%
Malaria $608,424 $27,689 $580,734 93% $79,042 $501693 77%
STI $35,028 $10,830 $24,198 64% $60,151 $(35,954) -123%
Pneumonia $20,815 $11,462 $9,354 35% $64,304 $(54,951) -237%




$4,734,779 $619,106 $4,115,672 87% $1,601,641 $2,514,030 53%
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lay to supervise quality and to package and distribute
the commodities is $2.09 million (Table 3 column 1) for
a total of nearly $4.1 million spent on its social franchise
operations in 2009. The $4.1 million was spent to add
value to an estimated 1.5 million medical care episodes
occurring in the private sector with a total cost to pa-
tients of $647,000. Taking the ratio of $4.1 million to the
number of episodes (1.5 million) one derives that PSI’s
social franchise spending amounts to $2.7 per medical
care episode. Taking the ratio of $4.1 million to patient
out of pocket spending on these 5 commodities
($648,000) and one derives a ratio of $6.32 spent by PSI
per patient dollar spent. Figure 2 shows this data in
terms of proportions. For every dollar spent on a med-
ical care episode, the patient is spending 14 cents at re-
tail, the social franchise is spending 42 cents to achieve
price reductions below the acquisition cost, and spend-
ing 44 cents to supervise the quality of care.Table 3 Costs of packaging, distribution, and quality
supervision at PSI Myanmar headquarters
2009 % 2008 % 2007 %




$234,530 11% $80,224 6% $56,952 4%
Vehicle/
Transport








$61,436 3% $44,319 3% $7,116 37%
Building Costs $180,502 9% $267,680 21% $64,665 14%
TOTAL $2,093,195 $1,272,519 $758,089The commodities needed for these 1.5 million consul-
tations would have cost $2.15 million at globally com-
petitive prices. In the absence of PSI’s social franchise
subsidies, most prices would have been higher for the
patients served in these private facilities without subsid-
ies, it is reasonable to assume that fewer providers would
have offered services and fewer patients would have
accessed services. Furthermore in the absence of PSI’s
social franchise, the quality of unsupervised consulta-
tions would probably have been lower. Studies are emer-
ging that measure the degree of quality improvement
and the degree to which the subsidies help the poor in
PSI Myanmar [10,11].
Discussion
Our analysis shows that in order for PSI to achieve sub-
sidized prices and quality supervision in its networks of





Retail price to 
patient
14%
Flow of Funds  in PSI Myanmar
Figure 2 Allocation of funds in a social franchise. For every
dollar spent on a medical care episode, the patient is spending 14
cents at retail, the social franchise is spending 42 cents to achieve
price reductions below the acquisition cost, and spending 44 cents
to supervise the quality of care.
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the people of Myanmar at PSI’s SQH clinics and SPH
providers in 2009, donors (via PSI) spent $6.32 to
achieve important goals in public health—quality assur-
ance and access to services that the poor may not have
otherwise been able to achieve.
Policymakers cite many reasons to be unhappy with
the unregulated provision of private health care. Until
our analysis, little has been known about the costs and
flow of funds in efforts to improve private sector health
services. We estimate that PSI Myanmar is spending
$2.7 per private sector medical care episode in efforts to
increase quality, affordability, accessibility, and usage in
its network. We are the first to benchmark this expend-
iture for Myanmar, and so we cannot yet say if this
spending should be more or less. However, in Myanmar
patients spending $1 for a medical care episode at a PSI
franchised facility are having their dollar matched by
$6.32 in spending by PSI and its sponsors in an effort to
achieve policy goals. Private providers that don’t
subsidize their medical services are viable, but the types
of services studied in this paper were provided with
$6.32 extra per $1.00 of commodities in order to achieve
better quality and subsidies for the poor. Going forward,
policy makers will need to determine how to finance in-
vestments in quality and lower prices for the poor and
how to achieve these goals efficiently.
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